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Perhaps some of the arguments in this book have convinced you. Perhaps it is a mistake to think of 
intellectual property in the same way we think of physical property. Perhaps limitations and 
exceptions to those rights are as important as the rights themselves. Perhaps the public domain has a 
vital and tragically neglected role to play in innovation and culture. Perhaps relentlessly expanding 
property rights will not automatically bring us increased innovation in science and culture. Perhaps 
the second enclosure movement is more troubling than the first. Perhaps it is unwise to extend 
copyright again and again, and to do so retrospectively, locking up most of twentieth-century culture 
in order to protect the tiny fragment of it that is still commercially available. Perhaps technological 
improvements bring both benefits and costs to existing rights holders – both of which should be 
considered when setting policy. Perhaps we need a vigorous set of internal limitations and exceptions 
within copyright, or control over content will inevitably become control over the medium of 
transmission. Perhaps the Internet should make us think seriously about the power of non-
proprietary and distributed production. 
Saying all this gives us some guidance in how we should think. It points out certain patterns of error. 
But its prescriptions are not simple. Precisely because it is not a rejection of intellectual property 
rights, but rather a claim that they only work well through a process of consciously balancing 
openness and control, public domain and private right, it still leaves open the question of where that 
point of balance is and how to strike it. 
In this chapter I want to offer a suggestion that in any other field would be stunningly obvious, 
boring even, but in the funhouse mirror of intellectual property appears revolutionary. We should 
make our policy based on empirical evidence of its likely effects and there should be a formal 
requirement of empirical reconsideration of those policies after they have been implemented to see if 
they are working. Why is this a good idea? 
Imagine a process of reviewing prescription drugs that goes like this: representatives from the drug 
company come to the regulators and argue that their drug works well and should be approved. They 
have no evidence of this beyond a few anecdotes about people who want to take it and perhaps 
some very simple models of how the drug might affect the human body. The drug is approved. No 
trials, no empirical evidence of any kind, no follow-up. Or imagine a process of making 
environmental regulations in which there were no data, and no attempts to gather data, about the 
effects of the particular pollutants being studied. Even the harshest critics of regulation would admit 
we generally do better than this. But this is often the way we make intellectual property policy. 
___________________________ 
* First published as The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, Yale University Press (2008) as Chapter 
9. A version is available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported 
licence at www.thepublicdomain.org/download/ 
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So how do we decide the ground rules of the information age? Representatives of interested 
industries come to regulators and ask for another heaping slice of monopoly rent in the form of 
an intellectual property right. They have doom-laden predictions, they have anecdotes, carefully 
selected to pluck the heartstrings of legislators, they have celebrities who testify – often 
incoherently, but with palpable charisma – and they have very, very simple economic models. 
The basic economic model here is ‘If you give me a larger right, I will have a larger incentive to 
innovate. Thus the bigger the rights, the more innovation we will get. Right?’ 
As I have tried to show here using the words of Jefferson and Macaulay and examples such as 
term extension, software copyrights, and garage door openers, this logic is fallacious. Even 
without data, the ‘more is better’ idea is obviously flawed. Copyrighting the alphabet will not 
produce more books. Patenting E=mc2 will not yield more scientific innovation. Intellectual 
property creates barriers to, as well as incentives toward, innovation. Jefferson agonised over 
the issue of when the benefits exceed the costs of a new right. ‘I know well the difficulty of 
drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an 
exclusive patent, and those which are not’. It is not clear that contemporary policymakers 
approach issues with anything like the same sophistication or humility. But it would be an equal 
mistake to conclude, as some do, that expansions of intellectual property are never justified. 
Extensions of rights can help or hurt, but without economic evidence beforehand and review 
afterward, we will never know. This point should be obvious, banal, even deeply boring, but 
sadly it is not. 
From Jefferson and Macaulay and Adam Smith, I derived a second point. In the absence of 
evidence on either side, the presumption should be against creating a new, legalised monopoly. 
The burden of proof should lie on those who claim, in any particular case, that the state should 
step in to stop competition, outlaw copying, proscribe technology, or restrict speech. They have 
to show us that the existing protection is not enough. But this presumption is a second-best 
solution and the empirical emptiness of the debates frustrating. 
This makes an occasion where there is some evidence a time for celebration. What we need is a 
test case in which one country adopts the proposed new intellectual property right and another 
similarly situated country does not, and we can assess how they are both doing after a number 
of years. 
There is such a case. It is the ‘database right’. 
OWNING FACTS? 
Europe adopted a Database Directive in 1996 which gave a high level of copyright protection 
to databases and conferred a new ‘sui generis’ database right even on unoriginal compilations of 
facts. In the United States, by contrast, in a 1991 case called Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the Supreme Court made it clear that unoriginal 
compilations of facts are not copyrightable. 
What does all this mean? Take the phone directory – that was the product at issue in the Feist 
case. A white pages directory is a database of names and numbers, compiled in alphabetical 
order by name. Does anyone have an intellectual property right over it? Not the particular dog-
eared directory lying next to your phone. Does the phone company that compiled it own the 
facts, the numbers inside that directory? Could they forbid me from copying them, adding 
others from surrounding areas, and issuing a competing directory that I believed consumers 
would find more valuable? This was an important issue for Feist because it went to the heart of 
their business. They issued regional telephone directories, combining records from multiple 
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phone companies. In this case, all the other companies in the region agreed to license their data 
to Feist. Rural did not, so Feist copied the information, checked as many entries as possible, 
adding addresses to some of the listings, and published the combined result. Rural sued and 
lost. The Supreme Court declared that mere alphabetical listings and other unoriginal assemblies 
of data cannot be copyrighted. 
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labour may be used by others 
without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not ‘some 
unforeseen by-product of a statutory scheme’. It is, rather, ‘the essence of copyright’, and a 
constitutional requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labour of 
authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’. To this end, copyright 
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon 
the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This principle, known as the idea/expression or 
fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual 
compilation, assuming the absence of original written expression, only the compiler’s selection 
and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither 
unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and 
art.1 
Feist was not as revolutionary as some critics claimed it to be. Most of the appeals courts in the 
United States had long held this to be the case. As the Court pointed out in the passage above, 
it is a fundamental tenet of the U.S. intellectual property system that neither facts nor ideas can 
be owned. Feist merely reiterated that point clearly and stressed that it was not just a policy 
choice, it was a constitutional requirement – a limit imposed by the Constitution’s grant of 
power to Congress to make copyright and patent laws. 
Daily politics cares little for the limitations imposed by constitutions or for the structural 
principle the Court describes – that we should leave facts free for others to build upon. Since 
1991, a few database companies have lobbied the Congress strenuously and continuously to 
create a special database right over facts. Interestingly, apart from academics, scientists, and civil 
libertarians, many database companies, and even those well-known property haters, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, oppose the creation of such a right. They believe that database 
providers can adequately protect themselves with contracts or technical means such as 
passwords, can rely on providing tied services, and so on. Moreover, they argue that strong 
database protection may make it harder to generate databases in the first place; the facts you 
need may be locked up. We need to focus on the inputs as well as the outputs of the process – a 
point I have tried to make throughout this book. The pressure to create a new right continues, 
however, aided by cries that the United States must ‘harmonize’ with Europe, where, you will 
remember, compilations of facts are strongly protected by intellectual property rights, even if 
their arrangement is unoriginal. 
So here we have our natural experiment. One major economy rejects such protection and resists 
pressure to create a new right. A different major economic region, at a comparable level of 
development, institutes the right with the explicit claim that it will help to produce new 
databases and make that segment of the economy more competitive. Presumably government 
economists in the United States and the European Union have been hard at work ever since, 
seeing if the right actually worked? Well, not exactly. 
Despite the fact that the European Commission has a legal obligation to review the Database 
Directive for its effects on competition, it was more than three years late issuing its report. At 
                                                        
1 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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first, during the review process, no attention was paid to the actual evidence of whether the 
Directive helps or hurts the European Union, or whether the database industry in the United 
States has collapsed or flourished. That is a shame, because the evidence was there and it was 
fairly shocking. Yet finally, at the end of the process, the Commission did turn to the evidence, 
as I will recount, and came to a remarkable conclusion – which was promptly stifled for political 
reasons. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. 
How do we frame the empirical inquiry? Intellectual property rights allow the creation of state-
backed monopolies, and ‘the general tendency of monopolies’, as Macaulay pointed out, is ‘to 
make articles scarce, to make them dear, and to make them bad’. Monopolies are an evil, but 
they must sometimes be accepted when they are necessary to the production of some good, 
some particular social goal. In this case, the ‘evil’ is obviously going to be an increase in the 
price of databases and the legal ability to exclude competitors from their use – that, after all, is 
the point of granting the new right. This right of exclusion may then have dynamic effects, 
hampering the ability of subsequent innovators to build on what went before. The ‘good’ is that 
we are supposed to get lots of new databases, databases that we would not have had but for the 
existence of the database right. 
If the database right were working, we would expect positive answers to three crucial questions. 
First, has the European database industry’s rate of growth increased since 1996, while the U.S. 
database industry has languished? (The drop-off in the U.S. database industry ought to be 
particularly severe after 1991 if the proponents of database protection are correct; they argued 
the Feist case was a change in current law and a great surprise to the industry.) 
Second, are the principal beneficiaries of the database right in Europe producing databases they 
would not have produced otherwise? Obviously, if a society is handing over a database right for 
a database that would have been created anyway, it is overpaying – needlessly increasing prices 
for consumers and burdens for competitors. This goes to the design of the right – has it been 
crafted too broadly, so that it is not being targeted to those areas where it is needed to 
encourage innovation? 
Third, and this one is harder to judge, is the new right promoting innovation and competition 
rather than stifling it? For example, if the existence of the right allowed a one-time surge of 
newcomers to the market who then use their rights to discourage new entrants, or if we 
promoted some increase in databases but made scientific aggregation of large amounts of data 
harder overall, then the database right might actually be stifling the innovation it is designed to 
foment. 
Those are the three questions that any review of the Database Directive must answer. But we 
have preliminary answers to those three questions and they are either strongly negative or 
extremely doubtful. 
Are database rights necessary for a thriving database industry? The answer appears to be no. In 
the United States, the database industry has grown more than twenty-five-fold since 1979 and – 
contrary to those who paint the Feist case as a revolution – for that entire period, in most of the 
United States, it was clear that unoriginal databases were not covered by copyright. The figures 
are even more interesting in the legal database market. The two major proponents of database 
protection in the United States are Reed Elsevier, the owner of Lexis, and Thomson Publishing, 
the owner of Westlaw. Fascinatingly, both companies made their key acquisitions in the U.S. 
legal database market after the Feist decision, at which point no one could have thought 
unoriginal databases were copyrightable. This seems to be some evidence that they believed 
they could make money even without a database right. How? In the old-fashioned way: 
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competing on features, accuracy, tied services, making users pay for entry to the database, and 
so on. 
If those companies believed there were profits to be made, they were right. Jason Gelman, a 
former Duke student, pointed out in a recent paper that Thomson’s legal regulatory division 
had a profit margin of over 26% for the first quarter of 2004. Reed Elsevier’s 2003 profit 
margin for LexisNexis was 22.8%. Both profit margins were significantly higher than the 
company average and both were earned primarily in the $6 billion U.S. legal database market, a 
market which is thriving without strong intellectual property protection over databases. (First 
rule of thumb for regulators: when someone with a profit margin over 20% asks you for 
additional monopoly protection, pause before agreeing.) 
What about Europe? There is some good news for the proponents of database protection. As 
Hugenholtz, Maurer, and Onsrud point out in a nice article in Science magazine, there was a 
sharp, one-time spike in the number of companies entering the European database market 
immediately following the implementation of the Directive in member states.2 Yet their work, 
and ‘Across Two Worlds’,3 a fascinating study by Maurer, suggests that the rate of entry then 
fell back to levels similar to those before the directive. Maurer’s analysis shows that the attrition 
rate was also very high in some European markets in the period following the passage of the 
directive – even with the new right, many companies dropped out. 
At the end of the day, the British database industry – the strongest performer in Europe – 
added about two hundred databases in the three years immediately after the implementation of 
the directive. In France, there was little net change in the number of databases and the number 
of providers fell sharply. In Germany, the industry added nearly three hundred databases 
immediately following the directive – a remarkable surge – about two hundred of which rapidly 
disappeared. During the same period, the U.S. industry added about nine hundred databases. 
Bottom line? Europe’s industry did get a one-time boost and some of those firms have stayed in 
the market; that is a benefit, though a costly one. But database growth rates have gone back to 
predirective levels, while the anticompetitive costs of database protection are now a permanent 
fixture of the European landscape. The United States, by contrast, gets a nice steady growth rate 
in databases without paying the monopoly cost. (Second rule of thumb for regulators: Do no 
harm! Do not create rights without strong evidence that the incentive effect is worth the 
anticompetitive cost.) 
Now the second question. Is the Database Directive encouraging the production of databases 
we would not have gotten otherwise? Here the evidence is clear and disturbing. Again, 
Hugenholtz et al. point out that the majority of cases brought under the directive have been 
about databases that would have been created anyway – telephone numbers, television 
schedules, concert times. A review of more recent cases reveals the same pattern. These 
databases are inevitably generated by the operation of the business in question and cannot be 
independently compiled by a competitor. The database right simply serves to limit competition 
in the provision of the information. Recently, the European Court of Justice implicitly 
underscored this point in a series of cases concerning football scores, horse racing results, and 
so on. Rejecting a protectionist and one-sided opinion from its Advocate General, the court 
ruled that the mere running of a business which generates data does not count as ‘substantial 
                                                        
2 Stephen M. Maurer, P. Bernt Hugenholtz, and Harlan J. Onsrud, ‘Europe’s Database Experiment,’ Science 
294 (2001): 789–90. 
3 Stephen M. Maurer, ‘Across Two Worlds: US and European Models of Database Protection,’ paper commissioned 
by Industry Canada (2001). 
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investment’ sufficient to trigger the database right. It would be nice to think that this is the 
beginning of some scepticism about the reach of the directive. Yet the court provides little 
discussion of the economic reasons behind its interpretation; the analysis is merely semantic and 
definitional, a sharp contrast to its competition decisions. 
So what kinds of creations are being generated by this bold new right? The answer is 
somewhere between bathos and pathos. Here are some of the wonderful ‘databases’ that people 
found it worthwhile litigating over: a Web site consisting of a collection of 259 hyperlinks to 
‘parenting resources’, a collection of poems, an assortment of advertisements, headings 
referring to local news, and charts of popular music. The sad list goes on and on. The European 
Commission might ask itself whether these are really the kind of ‘databases’ that we need a legal 
monopoly to encourage and that we want to tie up judicial resources protecting. The point that 
many more such factual resources can be found online in the United States without any 
legalised database protection also seems worthy of note. At the very least, the evidence indicates 
that the right is drawn much too broadly and triggered too easily in ways that produce litigation 
but little social benefit. 
Now, in one sense, these lawsuits over trivial collections of hyperlinks and headlines might be 
seen as irrelevant. They may indicate we are handing out rights unnecessarily – did we really 
need a legal monopoly, and court involvement, to get someone to compile hyperlinks on a Web 
page? But it is hard to see social harm. As with the patents over ‘sealed crustless’ peanut butter 
sandwiches or ‘methods of swinging on a swing’, we may shake our heads at the stupidity of the 
system, but if the problems consist only of trivial creations, at least we are not likely to grieve 
because some vital piece of information was locked up. But we should not be so quick to 
declare such examples irrelevant. They tend to show that the system for drawing the boundaries 
of the right is broken – and that is of general concern, even if the issue at hand is not. 
Finally, is the database right encouraging scientific innovation or hurting it? Here the evidence 
is merely suggestive. Scientists have claimed that the European database right, together with the 
perverse failure of European governments to take advantage of the limited scientific research 
exceptions allowed by the directive, have made it much harder to aggregate data, to replicate 
studies, and to judge published articles. In fact, academic scientific bodies have been among the 
strongest critics of database protection. But negative evidence, by its nature, is hard to produce; 
‘show me the science that did not get done!’ Certainly, both U.S. science and commerce have 
benefited extraordinarily from the openness of U.S. data policy. I will deal with this issue in the 
next part of this chapter. 
If the United States does not give intellectual property protection to raw data, to facts, how is it 
that the database industry has managed to thrive here and to do better than in Europe, which 
has extremely strong protection? The economists described in Chapter 1 would surely tell us 
that this is a potential ‘public goods’ problem. If it is hard to exclude others from the resource – 
it is cheap and easy to copy – and if the use of the resource is not ‘rival’ – if I don’t use up your 
facts by consulting them – then we ought to see the kind of dystopia economists predict. What 
would that consist of? First it might result in underproduction. Databases with a social value 
higher than their cost of creation would not get made because the creator could not get an 
adequate return on investment. In some cases it might even lead to the reverse – 
overproduction, where each party creates the database for itself. We get a social overinvestment 
to produce the resource because there is no legal right to exclude others from it. If you gave the 
first creator an intellectual property right over the data, they could sell to subsequent users at a 
price lower than their own cost to create the database. Everyone would win. But the United 
States did not give the intellectual property right and yet its database industry is flourishing. 
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There are lots of commercial database providers and many different kinds of databases. How 
can this be? Is the economic model wrong? 
The answer to that is no, the model is not wrong. It is, however, incomplete and all too often 
applied in sweeping ways without acknowledging that its basic assumptions may not hold in a 
particular case. That sounds vague. Let me give a concrete example. Westlaw is one of the two 
leading legal database providers and, as I mentioned before, one of the key proponents of 
creating intellectual property rights over unoriginal databases. (There is considerable question 
whether such a law would be constitutional in the United States, but I will pass over that 
argument for the moment.) Westlaw’s ‘problem’ is that much of the material that it provides to 
its subscribers is not covered by copyright. Under Section 105 of the U.S. Copyright Act, works 
of the federal government cannot be copyrighted. They pass immediately into the public 
domain. Thus all the federal court decisions, from district courts all the way up to the Supreme 
Court, all the federal statutes, the infinite complexity of the Federal Register, all this is free from 
copyright. This might seem logical for government-created work, for which the taxpayer has 
already paid, but as I will explain in the next section of the chapter, not every country adopts 
such a policy. 
West, another Thomson subsidiary that owns Westlaw, publishes the standard case reporter 
series. When lawyers or judges refer to a particular opinion, or quote a passage within an 
opinion, they will almost always use the page number of the West edition. After all, if no one 
else can find the cases or statutes or paragraphs of an opinion that you are referring to, legal 
argument is all but impossible. (This might seem like a great idea to you. I beg to differ.) As 
electronic versions of legal materials became more prevalent, West began getting more 
competition. Its competitors did two things that West found unforgivable. First, they frequently 
copied the text of the cases from West’s electronic services, or CD-ROMs, rather than retyping 
them themselves. Since the cases were works of the federal government, this was perfectly legal 
provided the competitors did not include West’s own material, such as summaries of the cases 
written by its employees or its key number system for finding related issues. Second, the 
competitors would include, within their electronic editions, the page numbers to West’s 
editions. Since lawyers need to cite the precise words or arguments they are referring to, 
providing the raw opinion alone would have been all but useless. Because West’s page numbers 
were one of the standard ways to cite case opinions, competitors would indicate where the page 
breaks on the printed page would have been, just as West did in its own databases. 
West’s reaction to all of this was exactly like Apple’s reaction in the story I told in Chapter 5 
about the iPod or like Rural’s reaction to the copying of its phone directory. This was theft! 
They were freeloading on West’s hard work! West had mixed its sweat with these sites, and so 
should be able to exclude other people from them! Since it could not claim copyright over the 
cases, West claimed copyright over the order in which they were arranged, saying that when its 
competitors provided its page numbers for citation purposes, they were infringing that 
copyright. 
In the end, West lost its legal battles to claim copyright over the arrangement of the collections 
of cases and the sequence in which they were presented. The Court held that, as with the phone 
directory, the order in which the cases were arranged lacked the minimum originality required to 
sustain a copyright claim.4 At this stage, according to the standard public goods story, West’s 
business should have collapsed. Unable to exclude competitors from much of the raw material 
of its databases, West would be undercut by competitors. More importantly, from the point of 
                                                        
4 Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
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view of intellectual property policy, its fate would deter potential investors in other databases – 
databases that we would lose without even knowing they could have been possible. Except that 
is not the way it turned out. West has continued to thrive. Indeed, its profits have been quite 
remarkable. How can this be? 
The West story shows us three ways in which we can leap too quickly from the abstract claim 
that some information goods are public goods – nonexcludable and nonrival – to the claim that 
this particular information good has those attributes. The reality is much more complex. Type 
www.westlaw.com into your Internet browser. That will take you to the home page of West’s 
excellent legal research service. Now, I have a password to that site. You probably do not. 
Without a password, you cannot get access to West’s site at all. To the average consumer, the 
password acts as a physical or technical barrier, making the good ‘excludable’ – that is, making it 
possible to exclude someone from it without invoking intellectual property rights. But what 
about competitors? They could buy access and use that access to download vast quantities of 
the material that is unprotected by copyright. Or could they? Again, West can erect a variety of 
barriers, ranging from technical limits on how much can be downloaded to contractual 
restrictions on what those who purchase its service can do (‘No copying every federal case’, for 
example). 
Let’s say the competitor somehow manages to get around all this. Let’s say it somehow avoids 
copying the material that West does have a copyright over – such as the headnotes and case 
synopses. The competitor launches their competing site at lower prices amidst much fanfare. 
Do I immediately and faithlessly desert West for a lower-priced competitor? Not at all. First of 
all, there are lots of useful things in the West database that are covered by copyright – law 
review articles and certain treatises, for example. The competitor frequently cannot copy those 
without coming to the same sort of agreements that West has with the copyright holders. For 
much legal research, that secondary material is as important as the cases. If West has both, and 
the competitor only one, I will stick with West. Second, West’s service is very well designed. (It 
is only their copyright policies I dislike, not the product.) If a judge cites a law review article in a 
case, West will helpfully provide a hyperlink to the precise section of the article she is referring 
to. I can click on it and in a second see what the substance of the argument is. The reverse is 
true if a law review article cites a statute or a case. Cases have ‘flags’ on them indicating whether 
they have been overruled or cited approvingly in subsequent decisions. In other words, faced 
with the competitive pressure of those who would commoditise their service and provide it at 
lower cost, West has done what any smart company would: added features and competed by 
offering a superior service. Often it has done so by ‘tying’ its uncopyrightable data structures to 
its huge library of copyrighted legal material. 
The company that challenged Westlaw in court was called Hyperlaw. It won triumphantly. The 
courts declared that federal cases and the page numbers in the West volumes were in the public 
domain. That decision came in 1998 and Westlaw has lobbied hard since then to reverse it by 
statute, to create some version of the Database Directive in the United States. To date, they 
have failed. The victor, Hyperlaw, has since gone out of business. Westlaw has not. 
This little story contains a larger truth. It is true that innovation and information goods will, in 
general, tend to be less excludable and less rival than a ham sandwich, say. But, in practice, 
some of them will be linked or connected in their social setting to other phenomena that are 
highly excludable. The software can easily be copied – but access to the help lines can be 
restricted with ease. Audiences cannot easily be excluded from viewing television broadcasts, 
but advertisers can easily be excluded from placing their advertisements in those programs. The 
noncopyrightable court decisions are of most use when embedded within a technical system 
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that gives easy access to other material – some of it copyrighted and all of it protected by 
technical measures and contractual restrictions. The music file can be downloaded; the band’s 
T-shirt or the experience of the live concert cannot. Does this mean that we never need an 
intellectual property right? Not at all. But it does indicate that we need to be careful when 
someone claims that ‘without a new intellectual property right I am doomed’. 
One final story may drive home the point. When they read Feist v. Rural, law students often 
assume that the only reason Feist offered to license the white pages listings from Rural is 
because they (mistakenly) thought they were copyrighted. This is unlikely. Most good copyright 
lawyers would have told you at the time of the Feist case that the ‘sweat of the brow’ decisions 
that gave copyright protection based on hard work were not good law. Most courts of appeals 
had said so. True, there was some legal uncertainty, and that is often worth paying to avoid. But 
switch the question around and suppose it is the day after the Supreme Court decides the Feist 
case, and Feist is heading off into another market to try to make a new regional phone 
directory. Do they now just take the numbers without paying for them, or do they still try to 
negotiate a license? The latter is overwhelmingly likely. Why? Well, for one thing, they would 
get a computer-readable version of the names and would not have to retype or optically scan 
them. More importantly, the contract could include a right to immediate updates and new 
listings. 
The day after the Feist decision, the only thing that had changed in the telephone directory 
market was that telephone companies knew for sure, rather than merely as a probability, that if 
they refused to license, their competitors could laboriously copy their old listings without 
penalty. The nuclear option was no longer available. Maybe the price demanded would be a 
little lower. But there would still be lots of good reasons for Feist to buy the information, even 
though it was uncopyrighted. You do not always need an intellectual property right to make a 
deal. Of course, that is not the whole story. Perhaps the incentives provided by other methods 
are insufficient. But in the U.S. database industry they do not seem to have been. Quite the 
contrary. The studies we have on the European and the American rules on database rights 
indicate that the American approach simply works better. 
I was not always opposed to intellectual property rights over data. Indeed, in a book written 
before the enactment of the Database Directive, I said that there was a respectable economic 
argument that such protection might be warranted and that we needed research on the issue.5 
Unfortunately, Europe got the right without the research. The facts are now in. If the European 
Database Directive were a drug, the government would be pulling it from the market until its 
efficacy and harmfulness could be reassessed. At the very least, the Commission needed a 
detailed empirical review of the directive’s effects, and needs to adjust the directive’s definitions 
and fine-tune its limitations. But there is a second lesson. There is more discussion of the 
empirical economic effects of the Database Directive in this chapter than in the six-hundred-
page review of the directive that the European Commission paid a private company to conduct, 
and which was the first official document to consider the issue. 
That seemed to me and to many other academics to be a scandal and we said so as loudly as we 
could, pointing out the empirical evidence suggesting that the directive was not working. Yet if 
it was a scandal, it was not a surprising one, because the evidence-free process is altogether 
typical of the way we make intellectual property policy. President Bush is not the only one to 
make ‘faith-based’ decisions. 
                                                        
5 James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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There was, however, a ray of hope. In its official report on the competitive effects of the 
Database Directive, the European Commission recently went beyond reliance on anecdote and 
industry testimony and did something amazing and admirable. It conducted an empirical 
evaluation of whether the directive was actually doing any good. 
The report honestly described the directive as ‘a Community creation with no precedent in any 
international convention’. Using a methodology similar to the one in this chapter on the subject, 
the Commission found that ‘the economic impact of the ‘sui generis’ right on database 
production is unproven. Introduced to stimulate the production of databases in Europe, the 
new instrument has had no proven impact on the production of databases’.6 
In fact, their study showed that the production of databases had fallen to pre-directive levels 
and that the U.S. database industry, which has no such intellectual property right, was growing 
faster than the European Union’s. The gap appears to be widening. This is consistent with the 
data I had pointed out in newspaper articles on the subject, but the Commission’s study was 
more recent and, if anything, more damning. 
Commission insiders hinted that the study may be part of a larger – and welcome – 
transformation in which a more professional and empirical look is being taken at the 
competitive effects of intellectual property protection. Could we be moving away from faith-
based policy in which the assumption is that the more new rights we create, the better off we 
will be? Perhaps. But unfortunately, while the report was a dramatic improvement, traces of the 
Commission’s older predilection for faith-based policy and voodoo economics still remain. 
The Commission coupled its empirical study of whether the directive had actually stimulated 
the production of new databases with another intriguing kind of empiricism. It sent out a 
questionnaire to the European database industry asking if they liked their intellectual property 
right – a procedure with all the rigor of setting farm policy by asking French farmers how they 
feel about agricultural subsidies. More bizarrely still, the report sometimes juxtaposed the two 
studies as if they were of equivalent worth. Perhaps this method of decision making could be 
expanded to other areas. We could set communications policy by conducting psychoanalytic 
interviews with state telephone companies – let current incumbents’ opinions determine what is 
good for the market as a whole. ‘What is your emotional relationship with your monopoly?’ ‘I 
really like it!’ ‘Do you think it hurts competition?’ ‘Not at all!’ 
There are also a few places where the reasoning in the report left one scratching one’s head. 
One goal of the database right was to help close the gap between the size of the European and 
U.S. database markets. Even before the directive, most European countries already gave greater 
protection than the United States to compilations of fact. The directive raised the level still 
higher. The theory was that this would help build European market share. Of course, the 
opposite is also possible. Setting intellectual property rights too high can actually stunt 
innovation. In practice, as the Commission’s report observes, ‘the ratio of European / U.S. 
database production, which was nearly 1:2 in 1996, has become 1:3 in 2004’.7 Europe had 
started with higher protection and a smaller market. Then it raised its level of protection and 
lost even more ground. Yet the report was oddly diffident about the possibility that the U.S. 
system actually works better. 
                                                        
6 First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, DG Internal Market and Services 
Working Paper (Brussels, Belgium: Commission of the European Communities, 2005), 5. 
7 ibid., 22. 
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In its conclusion, the report offered a number of possibilities, including repealing the directive, 
amending it to limit or remove the ‘sui generis’ right while leaving the rest of the directive in 
place, and keeping the system as it is. The first options are easy to understand. Who would want 
to keep a system when it is not increasing database production, or European market share, and, 
indeed, might be actively harmful? Why leave things as they are? The report offers several 
reasons. 
First, database companies want to keep the directive. (The report delicately notes that their 
‘endorsement … is somewhat at odds with the continued success of U.S. publishing and 
database production that thrives without … [such] protection’, but nevertheless appears to be ‘a 
political reality’.) Second, repealing the directive would reopen the debate on what level of 
protection is needed. Third, change may be costly. 
Imagine applying these arguments to a drug trial. The patients in the control group have done 
better than those given the drug and there is evidence that the drug might be harmful. But the 
drug companies like their profits and want to keep the drug on the market. Though ‘somewhat 
at odds’ with the evidence, this is a ‘political reality’. Getting rid of the drug would reopen the 
debate on the search for a cure. Change is costly – true. But what is the purpose of a review if 
the status quo is always to be preferred? 
The final result? Faced with what Commission staff members tell me was a tidal wave of 
lobbying from publishers, the Commission quietly decided to leave the directive unchanged, 
despite the evidence. The result itself is not remarkable. Industry capture of a regulatory 
apparatus is hardly a surprise. What is remarkable is that this is one of the first times any entity 
engaged in making intellectual property policy on the international level has even looked 
seriously at the empirical evidence of that policy’s effects. 
To be sure, figures are thrown around in hearings. The software industry will present studies 
showing, for example, that it has lost billions of dollars because of illicit copying. It has indeed 
lost profits relative to what it could get with all the benefits of cheaper copying and 
transmission worldwide and with perfect copyright enforcement as well. (Though the 
methodology of some of the studies, which assumes that each copier would have paid full price 
– is ridiculous.) But this simply begs the question. A new technology is introduced that 
increases the size of your market and decreases your costs dramatically, but also increases illicit 
copying. Is this cause for state intervention to increase your level of rights or the funds going 
toward enforcement of copyright law, as opposed to any other law enforcement priority? The 
question for empirical analysis, both before and after a policy change, should be ‘Is this change 
necessary in order to maintain incentives for production and distribution? Will whatever 
benefits it brings outweigh the costs of static and dynamic losses – price increases to consumers 
and impediments to future innovators?’ The content companies might still be able to justify the 
extensions of their rights. But they would be doing so in the context of a rational, evidence-
based debate about the real goals of intellectual property, not on the assumption that they have 
a natural right to collect all the economic surplus gained by a reduction in the costs of 
reproduction and distribution. 
DOES PUBLIC INFORMATION WANT TO BE FREE? 
The United States has much to learn from Europe about information policy. The ineffectively 
scattered U.S. approach to data privacy, for example, produces random islands of privacy 
protection in a sea of potential vulnerability. Until recently, your video rental records were 
better protected than your medical records. Europe, by contrast, has tried to establish a holistic 
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framework, a much more effective approach. But there are places where the lessons should 
flow the other way. The first one, I have suggested, is database protection. The second is a 
related but separate issue: the legal treatment of publicly generated data, the huge, and hugely 
important, flow of information produced by government-funded activities – from ordnance 
survey maps and weather data to state-produced texts, traffic studies, and scientific information. 
How is this flow of information distributed? The norm turns out to be very different in the 
United States and in Europe. 
In one part of the world, state-produced data flows are frequently viewed as revenue sources. 
They are often copyrighted or protected by database rights. Many of the departments which 
produce them attempt to make a profit or at least to recover their entire operating costs 
through user fees. It is heresy to suggest that the taxpayer has already paid for the production of 
this data and should not have to do so twice. The other part of the world practices a benign 
form of information socialism. By law, any text produced by the central government is free 
from copyright and passes immediately into the public domain. The basic norm is that public 
data flows should be available at the cost of reproduction alone. 
It is easy to guess which area is which. The United States is surely the profit and property-
obsessed realm, Europe the place where the state takes pride in providing data as a public 
service? No, actually, it is the other way around. 
Take weather data. The United States makes complete weather data available to all at the cost of 
reproduction. If the superb government Web sites and data feeds are insufficient, for the cost 
of a box of blank DVDs you can have the entire history of weather records across the 
continental United States. European countries, by contrast, typically claim government 
copyright over weather data and often require the payment of substantial fees. Which approach 
is better? I have been studying the issue for fifteen years, and if I had to suggest a single article 
it would be the magisterial study by Peter Weiss called ‘Borders in Cyberspace’, published by 
the National Academies of Science.8 Weiss shows that the U.S. approach generates far more 
social wealth. True, the information is initially provided for free, but a thriving private weather 
industry has sprung up which takes the publicly funded data as its raw material and then adds 
value to it. The U.S. weather risk management industry, for example, is more than ten times 
bigger than the European one, employing more people, producing more valuable products, 
generating more social wealth. Another study estimates that Europe invests 9.5 billion Euros in 
weather data and gets approximately 68 billion back in economic value – in everything from 
more efficient farming and construction decisions to better holiday planning – a sevenfold 
multiplier. The United States, by contrast, invests twice as much – 19 billion – but gets back a 
return of 750 billion Euros, a thirty-nine-fold multiplier. 
Other studies suggest similar patterns elsewhere, in areas ranging from geospatial data to traffic 
patterns and agriculture. The ‘free’ information flow is better at priming the pump of economic 
activity. 
Some readers may not thrill to this way of looking at things because it smacks of private 
corporations getting a ‘free ride’ on the public purse – social wealth be damned. But the 
benefits of open data policies go further. Every year the monsoon season kills hundreds and 
causes massive property damage in Southeast Asia. One set of monsoon rains alone killed 660 
people in India and left 4.5 million homeless. Researchers seeking to predict the monsoon 
                                                        
8 In Open Access and the Public Domain in Digital Data and Information for Science: Proceedings of an International 
Symposium (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004), 69–73, available at 
books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id?11030&page?69. 
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sought complete weather records from the United States and Europe so as to generate a model 
based on global weather patterns. The U.S. data was easily and cheaply available at the cost of 
reproduction. The researchers could not afford to pay the price asked by the European weather 
services, precluding the ‘ensemble’ analysis they sought to do. Weiss asks rhetorically, ‘What is 
the economic and social harm to over 1 billion people from hampered research?’ In the wake of 
the outpouring of sympathy for tsunami victims in the same region, this example seems 
somehow even more tragic. Will the pattern be repeated with seismographic, cartographic, and 
satellite data? One hopes not. 
The European attitude may be changing. Competition policy has already been a powerful force 
in pushing countries to rethink their attitudes to government data. The European Directive on 
the Re-use of Public Sector Information takes large strides in the right direction, as do studies 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and several 
national initiatives.9 Unfortunately, though, most of these follow the same pattern. An initially 
strong draft is watered down and the utterly crucial question of whether data should be 
provided at the marginal cost of reproduction is fudged or avoided. This is a shame. Again, if 
we really believed in evidence-based policy making, the debate would be very different. 
BREAKING THE DEAL 
What would the debate look like if we took some of the steps I mention here? Unfortunately 
there are very few examples of evidence-based policy making, but the few that do exist are 
striking. 
In 2006, the government-convened Gowers Review of intellectual property policy in the United 
Kingdom considered a number of proposals on changes to copyright law, including a 
retrospective extension of sound recording copyright terms.1010 The copyright term for sound 
recordings in the United Kingdom is fifty years. (It is longer for compositions.) At the end of 
the fifty-year period, the recording enters the public domain. If the composition is also in the 
public domain – the great orchestral works of Beethoven, Brahms, and Mozart, for example, or 
the jazz classics of the early twentieth century – then anyone can copy the recording. This 
means we could make it freely available in an online repository for music students throughout 
Britain – perhaps preparing the next generation of performers – or republish it in a digitally 
cleansed and enhanced edition. If the composition is still under copyright, as with much 
popular music, then the composer is still entitled to a licensing fee, but now any music publisher 
who pays that fee can reissue the work – introducing competition and, presumably, bringing 
down prices of the recording. 
The recording industry, along with successful artists such as Sir Cliff Richard and Ian Anderson 
of Jethro Tull, wished to extend the fifty-year term to ninety-five years, or perhaps even longer 
                                                        
9 Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the Re-
use of Public Sector Information, Official Journal of the European Union, L 345 (31.12.2003): 90–96; 
Public Sector Modernisation: Open Government, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2005), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/35/34455306.pdf; The Socioeconomic 
Effects of Public Sector Information on Digital Networks: Toward a Better Understanding of Different 
Access and Reuse Policies (February 2008 OECD conference), more information at 
www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_2649_201185_40046832_1_1_1_1,00.html; and the government 
sites of individual countries in the European Union such as Ireland (www.psi.gov.ie/). 
10 Andrew Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (London: HMSO, 2006), available at www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf.  
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– the life of the performer, plus seventy years. This proposal was not just for new recordings, 
but for the ones that have already been made. 
Think of the copyright system as offering a deal to artists and record companies. ‘We will enlist 
the force of the state to give you fifty years of monopoly over your recordings. During that 
time, you will have the exclusive right to distribute and reproduce your recording. After that 
time, it is available to all, just as you benefited from the availability of public domain works 
from your predecessors. Will you make records under these terms?’ 
Obviously, fifty years of legalised exclusivity was enough of an incentive to get them to make 
the music in the first place. We have the unimpeachable evidence that they actually did. Now 
they want to change the terms of the deal retrospectively. They say this will ‘harmonise’ the law 
internationally, give recordings the same treatment as compositions, help struggling musicians, 
and give the recording industry some extra money that it might spend on developing new talent. 
(Or on Porsches, shareholder dividends, and plastic ducks. If you give me another forty-five 
years of monopoly rent, I can spend it as I wish.) 
Change the context and think about how you would react to this if the deal was presented to 
you personally. You hired an artist to paint a portrait. You offered $500. He agreed. You had a 
deal. He painted the painting. You liked it. You gave him the money. A few years later he 
returned. ‘You owe me another $450’, he said. 
You both looked at the contract. ‘But you agreed to paint it for $500 and I paid you that 
amount’. He admitted this was true, but pointed out that painters in other countries sometimes 
received higher amounts, as did sculptors in our own country. In fact, he told you, all painters in 
our country planned to demand another $450 for each picture they had already painted as well 
as for future pictures. This would ‘harmonise’ our prices with other countries, put painting on 
the same footing as sculpture, and enable painters to hire more apprentices. His other argument 
was that painters often lost money. Only changing the terms of their deals long after they were 
struck could keep them in business. Paying the money was your duty. If you did not pay, it 
meant that you did not respect art and private property. 
You would find these arguments absurd. Yet they are the same ones the record industry used, 
relying heavily on the confusions against which this book has warned. Is the record companies’ 
idea as outrageous as the demands of my imaginary painter? It is actually worse. 
The majority of sound recordings made more than forty years ago are commercially unavailable. 
After fifty years, only a tiny percentage is still being sold. It is extremely hard to find the 
copyright holders of the remainder. They might have died, gone out of business, or simply 
stopped caring. Even if the composer can be found, or paid through a collection society, 
without the consent of the holder of the copyright over the musical recording, the work must 
stay in the library. These are ‘orphan works’ – a category that probably comprises the majority 
of twentieth-century cultural artefacts. 
Yet as I pointed out earlier, without the copyright holder’s permission, it is illegal to copy or 
redistribute or perform these works, even if it is done on a non-profit basis. The goal of 
copyright is to encourage the production of, and public access to, cultural works. It has done its 
job in encouraging production. Now it operates as a fence to discourage access. As the years go 
by, we continue to lock up 100% of our recorded culture from a particular year in order to 
benefit an ever-dwindling percentage – the lottery winners – in a grotesquely inefficient cultural 
policy. 
Finally, fifty years after they were made, sound recordings enter the public domain in the United 
Kingdom (though as I pointed out earlier, licensing fees would still be due to the composer if 
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the work itself was still under copyright). Now anyone – individual, company, specialist in 
public domain material – could offer the work to the public. But not if the record companies 
can persuade the government otherwise. Like my imaginary painter, they want to change the 
terms of the deal retrospectively. But at least the painter’s proposal would not make the vast 
majority of paintings unavailable just to benefit a tiny minority of current artists. 
The recording industry’s proposal for retrospective extension was effectively a tax on the 
British music-buying public to benefit the copyright holders of a tiny proportion of sound 
recordings. The public loses three times. It loses first when it is forced to continue to pay 
monopoly prices for older, commercially available music, rather than getting the benefit of the 
bargain British legislators originally offered: fifty years of exclusivity, then the public domain. 
The public loses a second time when, as a side effect, it is denied access to commercially 
unavailable music; no library or niche publisher can make the forgotten recordings available 
again. Finally, the public loses a third time because allowing retrospective extensions will distort 
the political process in the future, leading to an almost inevitable legislative capture by the tiny 
minority who find that their work still has commercial value at the end of the copyright term 
they were originally granted. As Larry Lessig has pointed out repeatedly, the time to have the 
debate about the length of the copyright term is before we know whose works will survive 
commercially. 
The whole idea is very silly. But if this is the silly idea we wish to pursue, then simply increase 
the income tax proportionately and distribute the benefits to those record companies and 
musicians whose music is still commercially available after fifty years. Require them to put the 
money into developing new artists – something the current proposal does not do. Let all the 
other recordings pass into the public domain. 
Of course, no government would consider such an idea for a moment. Tax the public to give a 
monopoly windfall to those who already hit the jackpot, because they claim their industry 
cannot survive without retrospectively changing the terms of its deals? It is indeed laughable. 
Yet it is a far better proposal than the one that was presented to the Gowers Review. 
What happened next was instructive. The Review commissioned an economic study of the 
effects of copyright term extension – both prospective and retrospective – on recorded music 
from the University of Cambridge’s Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law. The 
resulting document was a model of its kind.11 
With painstaking care and a real (if sometimes fruitless) attempt to make economic arguments 
accessible to ordinary human beings, the study laid out the costs and benefits of extending the 
copyright term over sound recordings. It pointed out that the time to measure the value of a 
prospective term extension is at the moment the copyright is granted. Only then does it 
produce its incentive effects. The question one must ask is how much value today does it give 
an artist or record company to have their copyright extended by a year at the end of the existing 
period of protection. Then one must look to see whether the benefits of the added incentive 
outweigh the social costs it imposes. To put it another way, if the state were selling today the 
rights to have protection from year fifty to year ninety-five, how much would a rational 
copyright holder pay, particularly knowing that there is only a small likelihood the work will 
even be commercially available to take advantage of the extension? Would that amount be 
greater than the losses imposed on society by extending the right? 
                                                        
11 University of Cambridge Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law, Review of the Economic 
Evidence Relating to an Extension of Copyright in Sound Recordings (2006), available at www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/B/4/gowers_ cipilreport.pdf. 
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Obviously, the value of the extension is affected by our ‘discount rate’ – the annual amount by 
which we must discount a pound sterling in royalties I will not receive for fifty-one years in 
order to find its value now. Unsurprisingly, one finds that the value of that pound in the future 
is tiny at the moment when it matters – today – in the calculation of an artist or distributor 
making the decision whether to create. Conservative estimates yield a present value between 3% 
and 9% of the eventual amount. By that analysis, a pound in fifty years is worth between three 
and nine pence to you today, while other estimates have the value falling below one penny. This 
seems unlikely to spur much creativity at the margin. Or to put it in the more elegant language 
of Macaulay, quoted in Chapter 2: 
I will take an example. Dr Johnson died 56 years ago. If the law were what my 
honourable and learned friend wishes to make it, somebody would now have the 
monopoly of Dr Johnson’s works. Who that somebody would be it is impossible to 
say; but we may venture to guess. I guess, then, that it would have been some 
bookseller, who was the assign of another bookseller, who was the grandson of a 
third bookseller, who had bought the copyright from Black Frank, the Doctor’s 
servant and residuary legatee, in 1785 or 1786. Now, would the knowledge that this 
copyright would exist in 1841 have been a source of gratification to Johnson? Would 
it have stimulated his exertions? Would it have once drawn him out of his bed before 
noon? Would it have once cheered him under a fit of the spleen? Would it have 
induced him to give us one more allegory, one more life of a poet, one more 
imitation of Juvenal? I firmly believe not. I firmly believe that a hundred years ago, 
when he was writing our debates for the Gentleman’s Magazine, he would very much 
rather have had twopence to buy a plate of shin of beef at a cook’s shop 
underground.12 
The art form is different, but the thought of a 1960s Cliff Richard or Ian Anderson being 
‘cheered under a fit of the spleen’ by the prospect of a copyright extension 50 years hence is 
truly a lovely one. 
Considering all these factors, as well as the effects on investment in British versus American 
music and on the balance of trade, the Cambridge study found that the extension would cost 
consumers between 240 and 480 million pounds, far more than the benefits to performers and 
recording studios. (In practice, the report suggested, without changes in the law, most of the 
benefits would not have gone to the original recording artist in any case.) It found prospective 
extension led to a clear social welfare loss. What of retrospective extension? 
The report considered, and found wanting, arguments that retrospective extension is necessary 
to encourage ‘media migration’ – the digitisation of existing works, for example. In fact, most 
studies have found precisely the reverse – that public domain works are more available and 
more frequently adapted into different media. (Look on Amazon.com for a classic work that is 
out of copyright – Moby-Dick, for example – and see how many adaptations and formats are 
available.) It also rejected the argument that harmonisation alone was enough to justify 
extension – retrospective or prospective – pointing out the considerable actual variation in both 
term and scope of rights afforded to performers in different countries. Finally, it warned of the 
‘hidden ‘ratcheting’ effect of harmonisation which results from the fact that harmonisation is 
almost invariably upwards’. Its conclusion was simple: 
[R]etrospective term extensions reduce social welfare. Thus, in this case, it would 
seem that basic theory alone is sufficient to provide strong, and unambiguous, 
                                                        
12 ibid., 21–22. 
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guidance for policy-makers … We therefore see no reason to quarrel with the 
consensus of the profession on this issue which as summed up by Akerlof et al. … 
[states] categorically that … [retrospective] extension provides essentially no incentive 
to create new works. Once a work is created, additional compensation to the 
producer is simply a windfall.13 
The Gowers Review agreed. Its fourth recommendation read simply, ‘Policy makers should 
adopt the principle that the term and scope of protection for IP rights should not be altered 
retrospectively’. Perhaps more important, though, was the simple paragraph at the front of the 
document captioned ‘The Approach of the Review’. It begins thus: ‘The Review takes an 
evidence-based approach to its policy analysis and has supplemented internal analysis by 
commissioning external experts to examine the economic impact of changes’.  
Why specify that one was taking an ‘evidence-based’ approach? At first, the comment seems 
unnecessary. What other approach would one take? Anecdotal? Astrological? But there is a 
framework in which empirical evidence of the effects of policy simply seems irrelevant – one 
based on natural right. When the Review was given to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, that frame of mind was much in evidence: 
The Gowers Review undertook an extensive analysis of the argument for extending 
the term. On economic grounds, the Review concluded that there was little evidence 
that extension would benefit performers, increase the number of works created or 
made available, or provide incentives for creativity; and it noted a potentially negative 
effect on the balance of trade … Gowers’s analysis was thorough and in economic 
terms may be correct. It gives the impression, however, of having been conducted 
entirely on economic grounds. We strongly believe that copyright represents a moral 
right of a creator to choose to retain ownership and control of their own intellectual 
property. We have not heard a convincing reason why a composer and his or her 
heirs should benefit from a term of copyright which extends for lifetime and beyond, 
but a performer should not … Given the strength and importance of the creative 
industries in the U.K., it seems extraordinary that the protection of intellectual 
property rights should be weaker here than in many other countries whose creative 
industries are less successful.14 
A couple of things are worth noting here. The first is that the Committee is quite prepared to 
believe that the effects of term extension would not benefit performers or provide incentives 
for creativity, and even to believe that it would hurt the balance of trade. The second is the 
curious argument in the last sentence. Other countries have stronger systems of rights and are 
less successful. We should change our regime to be more like them! Obviously the idea that a 
country’s creative industries might be less successful because their systems of rights were 
stronger does not occur to the Committee for a moment. Though it proclaims itself to be 
unaffected by economic thought, it is in fact deeply influenced by the ‘more rights equals more 
innovation’ ideology of maximalism that I have described in these pages. 
Nestling between these two apparently contradictory ideas is a serious argument that needs to 
be confronted. Should we ignore evidence – even conclusive evidence – of negative economic 
effects, harm to consumers, and consequences for the availability of culture because we are 
dealing with an issue of moral right, almost natural right? Must we extend the rights of the 
                                                        
13 ibid. 
14 House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, Fifth Report (2007), available at 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmcumeds/509/50910.htm. 
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artists who recorded those songs (or rather the record companies who immediately acquired 
their copyrights) because they are simply theirs as a matter of natural justice? Do performers 
have a natural right to recorded songs either because they have laboured on them, mixing their 
sweat with each track, or because something of their personality is forever stamped into the 
song? Must we grant an additional forty-five years of commercial exclusivity, not because of 
economic incentive, but because of natural right? 
Most of us feel the pull of this argument. I certainly do. But as I pointed out in Chapter 2, there 
are considerable problems with such an idea. First, it runs against the premises of actual 
copyright systems. In the United States, for example, the Constitution resolutely presents the 
opposite picture. Exclusive rights are to encourage progress in science and the useful arts. The 
Supreme Court has elaborated on this point many times, rejecting both labour-based ‘sweat of 
the brow’ theories of copyright and more expansive visions based on a natural right to the 
products of one’s genius – whether inventions or novels. Britain, too, has a history of looking 
to copyright as a utilitarian scheme – though with more reference to, and legal protection of, 
particular ‘moral rights’ than one finds in the United States. But even in the most expansive 
‘moral rights’ legal systems, even in the early days of debate about the rights of authors after the 
French Revolution, it is accepted that there are temporal limits on these rights. If this is true of 
authors, it is even more true of performers, who are not granted the full suite of author’s rights 
in moral rights jurisdictions, being exiled to a form of protection called ‘neighbouring’ rights. 
In all of these schemes, there are time limits on the length of the rights (and frequently different 
ones for different creators – authors, inventors, performers, and so on). Once one has accepted 
that point, the question of how long they should be is, surely, a matter for empirical and 
utilitarian analysis. One cannot credibly say that natural rights or the deep deontological 
structure of the universe gives me a right to twenty-eight or fifty-six or seventy years of 
exclusivity. The argument must turn instead to a question of consequences. Which limit is 
better? Once one asks that question, the Gowers Review’s economic assessment is 
overwhelming, as the Select Committee itself recognised. In the end, the government agreed – 
noting that a European Union study had found precisely the same thing. The sound recording 
right should not be extended, still less extended retrospectively. The evidence-free zone had 
been penetrated. But not for long. As this book went to press, the European Commission 
announced its support for an even longer Europe-wide extension of the sound recording right. 
The contrary arguments and empirical evidence were ignored, minimised, explained away. How 
can this pattern be broken? 
In the next and final chapter, I try to answer that question. I offer a partial explanation for the 
cognitive and organisational blindnesses that have brought us to this point. I argue that we have 
much to learn from the history, theory, and organisational practices of the environmental 
movement. The environmental movement taught us to see ‘the environment’ for the first time, 
to recognise its importance, and to change the way we thought about ecology, property, and 
economics in consequence. What we need is an environmentalism of mind, of culture, of 
information. In the words of my colleague David Lange, we need to ‘recognize the public 
domain’. And to save it. 
